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The paper “Understanding High Crime Rates in Latin America: the Role of Social and 
Policy Factors” contradicts a widespread opinion, held by political commentators and 
policy makers alike, according to which Latin America is an exceptional region in terms 
of crime and violence. The paper shows that homicide rates in Latin America are not 
much different from what one should have expected given its “crime fundamentals.” 
Three factors, in particular, appear to explain much of Latin America high crime rates: 
high-income inequality, very low incarceration rates, and small police forces.    
 
This conclusion has a straightforward policy implication. If Latin American high levels 
of crime and violence are not the consequences of some mysterious social or historical 
force, but the manifestation of identifiable failures of public policy, then violence is 
tractable. The findings of this paper cast many doubts on the defeatism that has 
characterized the public discourse in Latin America regarding the issues of crime and 
violence. While I agree with the main findings of the paper, as well as with its main 
message of optimism, I think some clarifications are in order about both the findings 
and the policy implications.  
 
One first point has to do with the novelty of the main claim made in the paper, namely, 
the non-exceptional nature of Latin American violence rates once crime fundamentals 
are taken into account. A similar finding is reported by Fanyzlber, Lederman and 
Loayza (2002) in their study about the cross-country determinants of the homicide rate. 
These authors estimate a dynamic panel for a sample of countries, and show that, after 
controlling for the average per capita income, the growth rate, the educational 
attainment of the adult population, the level inequality and the arrest rate, a Latin 
American dummy variable is non-significant. Again, the evidence indicates that mean 
levels of violence in Latin America are not different from what should be expected 
given this region’s economic, social and law-enforcement characteristics. 
 
It is worth pointing out that Fanyzlber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) use a different 
methodology to reach the same conclusion. They do not rely on estimated elasticities to build a simple counterfactual (what would the violence and crime levels in Latin 
America be had this region had the social and law-enforcement characteristics of a 
typical developed country?). They use instead a regression framework in order to show 
that, once the main characteristics are controlled for, the actual violence levels observed 
in Latin America are normal.  
 
My second point has to do with the issue of crime dynamics and (in particular) with the 
issue of ascending spirals of crime that are common in many places of Latin America. 
The point is simple: the linear extrapolation used in the paper is not adequate to account 
for explosive dynamics of violent crime. Sometimes crime fundamentals are insufficient 
to comprehend the punctuated evolution of crime and violence. One example suffices to 
illustrate this point. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the homicide rate in Colombia in 
the period 1962-1994. The homicide rate went from 22 homicides per 100.000 residents 
in the late seventies to almost 80 in the early nineties.  
 
Gaviria (2000) summarizes the main mechanisms underlying the escalation of homicide 
rates in Colombia. Crime fundamentals have little to do with it. Inequality did not 
change much during the period. Incarceration rates and the relative size of police force 
also remained unchanged. The explosive dynamic was triggered by the cocaine trade 
and in particular by the emergence of Colombia as the main exporter of cocaine to the 
United States. However, this is only part of the story. In Colombia, violence fed into 
itself. Violence made violent crime more appealing by congesting the law enforcement 
system and hence lowering the probability of punishment. Besides, the interaction of 
career criminals and local crooks speeds up the diffusion of criminal know-how and 
criminal technology. Finally, the daily contact of youth with criminal adults and 
criminal peers resulted in the erosion of morals and hence in a greater predisposition 
toward crime. As a result, a specific crime shock was greatly amplified.  
 
This example is relevant because it shows that large deviations from the level of 
violence dictated by crime fundamentals are quite possible. In the same vein, the 
Colombian case indicates that an understanding of crime waves requires a thorough 
description of the mechanisms though which violence begets violence. This point is not 
a minor one since, as mentioned earlier, crime waves are common in many places in 
Latin America in particular and the world in general.   
My third point is almost a mirror image of the previous one. The point is related to the 
well-known non-linear prediction bias. The elasticities used in the paper, based on data 
from the United States, probably underestimate policy responses in communities with 
high levels of crime. The case studies presented at the end of the paper suggests that 
normal elasticities do not apply in the most successful policy interventions. In many 
cases, the responses went well beyond what should be expected given the estimated 
elasticities. Successful policies are not only about substantial changes in crime 
fundamentals. They are mainly about big responses to smart policies. In other words, 
successful policies often imply substantial crime multipliers.  
 
Figure 1. Homicide rate in Colombia, 1962-1994 
 
 
While the simple arithmetic presented in section 6 of the paper suggests that changes in 
law enforcement variables can by themselves have a substantial effect on crime, the 
case studies presented in section 7 suggest that these changes are most successful if 
accompanied by interventions in other dimensions: “citizen culture,” justice, restrictions 
on alcohol sales, etc. Put differently, the arithmetic of section 6 shows that there is 
ample scope for action, the examples of section 7 shows that action is often more complex than simply increasing the size of the police force or raising incarceration 
rates.  
 











Figure 2 shows the dramatic decline of the homicide rate in the city of Medellin. In 
1990, Medellin was the murder capital of the world: the recorded homicide rate was 
then close to 400 per 100.000 residents. During the early nineties, homicides decreased 
substantially following the decline of Medellin in the cocaine trade but it still remained 
very high. Recently, however, the homicide rate plummeted. What happened? More and 
better policing is a good part of the story. But it is not the whole story. Big libraries and 
new schools were built in the most violent areas of the city. Public transportation was 
greatly improved. Educational programs for youth at risk were implemented (Bastidas, 
2007).  While it is difficult to tease out the effects of the different elements of a complex 
(and an ongoing) strategy, it cannot be argued, in the absence of further evidence, that 
these other elements do not play an important role.  
 
My last point is also related to the previous one. Any discussion about the fundamental 
factors that determine the levels of crime and violence cannot avoid the issue of illegal drugs. Fanyzlber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) show that, after controlling for social 
and law-enforcement characteristics, a dummy variable designating drug producing 
countries is significant. Needless to say, illegal drug trade is an important determinant 
of crime and violence. Drug trafficking directly increases violence through their 
murderous activities. At the same time, drug trafficking indirectly increases violence 
through several channels: congestion of law enforcement, knowledge spillovers, and 
cultural change.  
 
Given this, policies aiming at reducing violence in Latin America must necessarily deal 
with the problem of drugs (and the problem of drug trade in particular). However, 
references to this problem are conspicuously absent from the paper. If drug trade is 
widespread, increasing the number of police officers or putting more criminals into 
prison will not reduced violence, as illustrated by recent events in Mexico. Put it 
succinctly, drug trade is another crime fundamental.  
 
To conclude, it is important to reiterate the main message of the paper: Latin American 
countries are not exceptional in terms of violent crime once fundamentals are taken into 
account. This fact suggests that there is ample scope for action, that there is much that 
can be done to reduce violence and crime in the region. In light of the evidence, law-
enforcement variables are a good place to start. But policies should go beyond the 
simple recipe of increasing the police force and building more prisons.  
 
Seemingly, a combination of policies is required. At a general level, crime and violence 
prevention needs to combine different approaches, not only related to criminal justice, 
but also to public health, conflict resolution, and community-driven development (UNODC 
&  World Bank, 2007). As mentioned in the paper, the combination of repressive 
measures with social support programs has been quite successful in some Latin 
American cities. The main challenge faced by academics and policy makers is to 
understand completely the mechanisms whereby these cities are leaving behind a legacy 
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